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Introduction: Publications arguing against the null hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) procedure and in favor of good statistical practices have increased. The most
frequently mentioned alternatives to NHST are effect size statistics (ES), confidence
intervals (CIs), and meta-analyses. A recent survey conducted in Spain found that
academic psychologists have poor knowledge about effect size statistics, confidence
intervals, and graphic displays for meta-analyses, which might lead to a misinterpretation
of the results. In addition, it also found that, although the use of ES is becoming
generalized, the same thing is not true for CIs. Finally, academics with greater knowledge
about ES statistics presented a profile closer to good statistical practice and research
design. Our main purpose was to analyze the extension of these results to a different
geographical area through a replication study.
Methods: For this purpose, we elaborated an on-line survey that included the same
items as the original research, and we asked academic psychologists to indicate their
level of knowledge about ES, their CIs, and meta-analyses, and how they use them.
The sample consisted of 159 Italian academic psychologists (54.09% women, mean
age of 47.65 years). The mean number of years in the position of professor was 12.90
(SD = 10.21).
Results: As in the original research, the results showed that, although the use of effect
size estimates is becoming generalized, an under-reporting of CIs for ES persists. The
most frequent ES statistics mentioned were Cohen’s d and R2/η2, which can have
outliers or show non-normality or violate statistical assumptions. In addition, academics
showed poor knowledge about meta-analytic displays (e.g., forest plot and funnel plot)
and quality checklists for studies. Finally, academics with higher-level knowledge about
ES statistics seem to have a profile closer to good statistical practices.
Conclusions: Changing statistical practice is not easy.This change requires statistical
training programs for academics, both graduate and undergraduate.
Keywords: effect size, confidence interval, meta-analysis, survey study, education
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INTRODUCTION
In the past 3 years, there has been increasing criticism of the null
hypothesis significance testing procedure (NHST) based on p-
values and the dichotomous decision to maintain or reject the
null hypothesis (e.g., Nuzzo, 2014; Trafimow and Marks, 2015;
Allison et al., 2016).
Most of the criticism refers to misconceptions about what the
results stemming from an NHST mean (e.g., the false belief that
the p-value is an indicator of the practical importance of the
findings), and the NHST “ritual” ends with the binary decision
to reject/not reject the null hypothesis (Badenes-Ribera et al.,
2015; Perezgonzalez, 2015). In addition, the quest for the magical
“p < 0.05” leads to bad statistical practices (e.g., p-hacking) that
distort scientific knowledge and harm scientific progress (Fanelli,
2009; Gadbury and Allison, 2014; Wicherts et al., 2016; Agnoli
et al., 2017).
Given these misconceptions about the p-value and the misuse
of the NHST procedure, the American Psychological Association
(American Psychological Association 2010; Appelbaum et al.,
2018), the American Educational Research Association (2006),
the American Statistician Association (ASA) (Wasserstein and
Lazar, 2016), the Open Science Collaboration (2015), the new
statistic approach (e.g., Cumming, 2012; Kline, 2013), and many
editors of psychology journals (e.g., Eich, 2014) make several
recommendations. For example, they recommend reporting
effect size statistics (ES) and their confidence intervals (CIs), in
an attempt to reduce overreliance on NHST and dichotomous
decisions (e.g., Maxwell et al., 2015; Krueger and Heck, 2017).
An effect size represents the strength or magnitude of a
relationship between the variables in the population, or a
sample-based estimate of that quantity (Cohen, 1988). Effect
sizes (ESs) provide more information than the p-value because
they address the question, “How large is the relationship or
difference?” Therefore, they can help to interpret whether the
effect observed in a study is large enough to be theoretically
or practically important. ES can be reported in raw units (e.g.,
means, differences between two means, proportions) or in some
standardized units (Cumming, 2014). Raw units provide a useful
estimate of effect size when the measures are reported on a
meaningful scale or well-known due to widespread use (e.g.,
IQ), and they can be used to compare studies that employ the
same scale (Fritz et al., 2012). Standardized ES can be useful for
comparing studies and conducting meta-analyses. Thus, meta-
analyses frequently focus on the simple correlation between the
independent and dependent variables as standardized ES input
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Dozens of standardized ES can be found.
Overall, two main groups can be distinguished: ES that use the
standardized group mean difference, such as Cohen’s d, Glass’s g,
Hedges’s gu, and Cohen’s f ; and ES based on the percentage of
explained variance or the correlations between variables, such as
r, R2/r2, η2, w2 (Rosnow and Rosenthal, 2009).
The most frequently reported ES measures in psychological
journals are r, R2, Cohen’s d, and η2 (Sun et al., 2010; Lakens,
2013; Peng et al., 2013). However, these measures have been
criticized for being biased (e.g., they tend to be positively biased),
for lack of robustness in the case of outliers, and for instability
when statistical assumptions are violated (Wang and Thompson,
2007; Grissom and Kim, 2012; Kline, 2013).
The CI for a parameter (e.g., effect size) defines a range of
values generated by a procedure that, in repeated-sampling, has a
fixed probability of containing the true value of the parameter
(Neyman, 1937). Some authors argue that the CI defines a
set of plausible (or likely) values for parameters. Thus, values
within the CIs would be more likely than those outside them.
Therefore, we might think of the lower and upper limits as
likely lower and upper boundaries for parameters (Cumming,
2014). Consequently, CIs would indicate the precision of the
estimate of the parameter, and so the width of a confidence
interval would represent the precision of the point estimate of
a statistic. Nevertheless, from a frequentist perspective, these
interpretations would not be correct. They would be fallacies,
given that they would involve “post-data” inferences, that is,
reasoning about the parameter from the observed data (Morey
et al., 2016). CIs generated from our data do not allow us to
make probability statements about parameters. In other words,
we cannot know the probability that a particular CI constructed
from our data includes the true value. Therefore, it would be
incorrect to interpret a CI as the probability that the true value
is within the interval (Kline, 2013; Hoekstra et al., 2014; García-
Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2016).
On the other hand, CIs might be used to carry out significance
testing by determining whether the null value is inside or
outside the interval (Kalinowski and Fidler, 2010; Cumming,
2012; García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2016). Prior research
showed that CIs allow better inference than statistical significance
testing in some conditions (Belia et al., 2005; Coulson et al.,
2010; Hoekstra et al., 2012). In sum, CIs have been proposed as
a possible tool to help reduce NHST misconceptions. However,
they are not immune to misinterpretations (Belia et al., 2005;
Hoekstra et al., 2014; García-Pérez and Alcalá-Quintana, 2016;
Kalinowski et al., 2018).
Finally, meta-analytic studies have gained considerable
relevance and prevalence in themost prestigious journals because
they synthesize all the evidence available to answer a question
based on the results of primary studies (Bauer, 2007). To conduct
a meta-analysis, the primary studies have to provide information
about ESs and their CIs. A meta-analysis facilitates more precise
effect size estimations, it allows researchers to rate the stability
of the effects, and it helps them to contextualize the effect size
values obtained in their studies. Moreover, the results of a meta-
analytic study help to plan future sample sizes by providing the
value of the estimated effect size in a specific research context. In
addition, meta-analytic studies can provide a definitive answer
about the nature of an effect when there are contradictory
results (Glass, 1976; Borenstein et al., 2009; Hempel et al.,
2013). Nevertheless, meta-analytic studies are not free of bias
or misuse (Rothstein et al., 2005; Kicinski, 2013; Ueno et al.,
2016). For example, Ferguson and Brannick (2011) analyzed 91
meta-analytic studies published in the American Psychological
Association and Association for Psychological Science journals
and found that 26 (41%) reported evidence of publication bias.
Therefore, researchers and readers of meta-analytic studies (such
as practitioner psychologists) should know about methods for
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detecting these biases (Bauer, 2007; Spring, 2007). In this way,
there are checklists to appraise the quality of meta-analytic
studies, such as AMSTAR or PRISMA-NMA.
A recent study examined the self-reported statistical practice
and knowledge level about effect size statistics and meta-analysis
in a sample of Spanish academics psychologists (Badenes-Ribera
et al., 2016a). According to the results, the academics mainly
said they used NHST for data analysis, and to a lesser degree,
effect-size statistics, although the latter were becoming more
generalized. In addition, the authors found that the academics
had poor knowledge about effect size statistics, graphic displays
for meta-analyses (e.g., forest plot and funnel plot), and quality
checklists for studies (e.g., PRISMA; CONSORT), which might
lead to a misinterpretation of results. Finally, academics with
greater knowledge about ES statistics presented a profile closer
to good statistical practice and research design.
Our main purpose was to analyze the extension of these
results to a different geographical area through a direct or exact
replication (Stroebe and Strack, 2014) of the aforementioned
study by Badenes-Ribera et al. (2016a). The original research was
conducted in Spain, whereas the present study was carried out
in Italy. For this purpose, we designed an on-line survey that
included the same items as in the original research, and we asked
academic psychologists to indicate their level of knowledge about
ES, their CIs, and meta-analyses, and how they use them.
In the Italian context, there is no information available about
the extension of these topics among academic psychologists.
Furthermore, the present work was part of a cross-cultural
research project between Spain and Italy about statistical
cognition and statistical practice, and it was framed within the
line of research on cognition and statistical education that our
research group has been developing for many years.
METHODS
Participants
A non-probabilistic (convenience) sample was used. The sample
comprised 159 Italian academic psychologists. Of the 159 Italians
participants, 45.9% were men, and 54.1% were women, with
a mean age of 47.65 years (SD = 10.47). The mean number
of years that the professors had spent in academia was 12.90
(SD = 10.21). Regarding Psychology knowledge areas, 18.2%
of the academics belonged to the area of Development and
Educational Psychology, 17.6% to the area of Clinical and
Dynamic Psychology, 17.6% to the area of Social Psychology,
17.6% to the area of General Psychology, 10.7% to the area of
Methodology, 10.1% to the area of Neuropsychology, and 8.6%
to the area of Work and Organizational Psychology. Regarding
the type of university, 86.2% worked in public universities (13.8%
private universities). Finally, 84.9% of the participants had been
reviewers for scientific journals in the past year.
Instrument
We used an Italian translation of the questionnaire by Badenes-
Ribera et al. (2016b) (see the Appendix in Supplementary
Material). Therefore, all the items were translated into Italian
by applying the standard back-translation procedure, which
involved translations from Spanish to Italian and vice versa
(Balluerka et al., 2007).
The first section of the questionnaire included items related to
information about sex, age, years of experience as an academic
psychologist, Psychology knowledge area, and Type of university
(private/public). The second section included a set of items
associated with statistical knowledge and statistical practice:
A. Knowledge and use of statistical terms, evaluated with
four questions:
1. “What terms from the following list are you sufficiently
familiar with? (you can choose more than one response):
standard deviation, confidence interval, sedimentation graph,
forest plot, ANOVA, funnel plot, correlation, meta-analysis,
regression analysis, effect size” (see Table 1).
2. “Can you give the name of an effect size statistic?”
3. “If you answered Yes, please specify its name” (open-ended
question) (see Table 2).
4. “In your scientific reports, what type of statistics do you
use more often?” Likert-type response scale with 5 response
ratings that range from 0 = not at all, to 4 = used quite often
(see Table 3).
B. Opinions and self-reported use of meta-analytic studies,
evaluated with two questions (see Table 4):
1. “What type of review do you think has themost credibility and
objectivity?” (choose only one response):
a) The narrative review carried out by experts (such as those
performed in the “Annual Review”).
b) The quantitative review or meta-analysis.
c) The qualitative review.
2. “Have you read or used a meta-analytic study?”
a) I have never read or used one.
b) Yes: I have read or used 1−2 meta-analytic studies.
c) Yes, I have read or used more than 2 meta-analytic studies.
C. Researcher’s behavior, evaluated with 11 questions related to
research design (e.g., estimate a priori sample size, strategies used
for it, and so on), reporting on the p-value, and interpretation of
the p-value (see Table 5).
To facilitate cross-references, we administered our
questionnaire in the same way and with identical instructions to
the original research. That is, the questionnaire was administered
online through a CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing)
system.
Procedure
The e-mail addresses of Italian academic psychologists were
found by consulting the websites of Italian universities,
resulting in 1,824 potential participants. Of the 1,824 potential
participants, 40.5% were men, and 59.5% were women.
Regarding Psychology knowledge areas, 23.6% of the academics
belonged to the area of Clinical and Dynamic Psychology,
21.9% to the area of General Psychology, 15.1% to the area of
Development and Educational Psychology, 14.1% to the area of
Social Psychology, 11.7% to the area of Neuropsychology, 6.2%
to the area of Methodology, and 7.4% to the area of Work
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TABLE 1 | Statistical terms the participants say they know sufficiently (%) (95% Confidence Interval).
Current study (N = 159) Spanish academics (N = 472)
(Badenes-Ribera et al., 2016a)
Difference scores between Italian and
Spanish academics
Standard deviation 99.4 (96.5, 99.9) 98.9 0.5 (−2.5, 1.9)
ANOVA 98.7 (95.5, 99.7) 97.5 1.2 (−2.1, 3.4)
Regression analysis 98.1 (94.6, 99.4) 94.5 3.6 (−0.3, 6.4)
Correlation 96.9 (92.9, 98.7) 98.5 −1.6 (−5.7, 0.7)
Confidence Intervals 93.7 (88.8, 96.6) NA –
Meta-analysis 92.5 (87.3, 95.6) 86.9 5.6 (−0.3, 10.2)
Effect size 81.8 (75, 87) 87.1 −5.3 (−12.6, 0.9)
Forest plot 17.6 (12.4, 24.2) 11 6.6 (0.6, 13.7)
Funnel plot 13.8 (9.3, 20.1) 7 6.8 (1.6, 13.4)
Sedimentation graphic 8.8 (5.3, 14.2) 45.1 −36.3 (−42, −29.3)
More than one answer could be selected. %, Percentage. NA, Not asked.
and Organizational Psychology. Finally, regarding the type of
university, 88.8% worked in public universities (11.2% private
universities).
Potential participants were invited to complete a survey
through the use of a CAWI system. A follow-upmessage was sent
2 weeks later to non-respondents. Individual informed consent
was also collected from the academics, along with written consent
describing the nature and objective of the study, following the
ethical code of the Italian Association for Psychology (AIP)
and with adherence to the privacy requirements required by
Italian law (Law DL-196/2003). The consent form stated that
data confidentiality would be ensured and that participation was
voluntary. As regards the ethical standards for research, the study
complied with the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki.
The response rate was 8.72%. The data collection was performed
fromMarch to May 2015.
Data Analysis
The analysis included descriptive statistics for the variables under
evaluation (e.g., frequencies and percentage). We used scoring
methods based on the studies by Newcombe (2012) in order to
calculate the confidence intervals for percentages. These analyses
were performed with the statistical program IBM SPSS v. 20 for
Windows.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the percentages of participants’ responses about
their level of knowledge about statistical terms. More than 90%
of participants thought they had an adequate knowledge of
CIs, analysis of variance, regression analysis, standard deviation,
correlation, and meta-analysis. Additionally, more than 80% said
they had adequate knowledge about the statistical terms for effect
size.
Although more than 90% percent of the participants said
they had adequate knowledge about meta-analyses, the statistical
terms of forest plot and funnel plot (graphics that usually
accompanymeta-analytic studies) were rated as being sufficiently
known by a very low percentage of the participants, as in the
original study. This was especially true of the funnel plot graphics,
which are used primarily as a visual aid for detecting publication
bias.
Regarding their knowledge about effect size statistics, 82% of
the participants stated that they had adequate knowledge about
effect sizes. However, only 44.7% (95% CI 37.1, 52.4) (n = 71)
stated that they knew some effect size statistic. Therefore, as in
the original study, there was greater knowledge about the term
“effect size” than about the actual use of effect size statistics.
Table 2 shows the effect size statistics known by participants.
The most familiar effect size statistics were those that evaluate
the differences between the means of the groups analyzed
(standardized mean difference), followed by the proportion of
variance explained (η2) and correlation coefficients.
Table 3 presents the self-reported use of statistics in research
reports. Overall, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the
most widely used statistic in research reports, followed by
correlation and regression analysis. In addition, the majority of
the participants (52.9%) said they used effect sizes and CIs little
(17 % and 18.9%) or not at all (17%) in their statistical reports.
Finally, discriminant analysis was utilized the least.
Table 4 presents the opinions and self-reported use of meta-
analytic studies. Most of the participants (66.2%) pointed out
that meta-analytic studies are the type of review with the most
credibility and objectivity, and they said they had used or read
a meta-analytic study for their research, as in the original study
with Spanish academics.
Table 5 shows the profile of Italian academics according to
whether or not they were able to indicate the name of an effect
size statistic, compared to the profile of Spanish academics from
the original study (Badenes-Ribera et al., 2016a). Overall, in
both samples, the academics who gave the name of an effect
size statistic had behaviors that were closer to good statistical
practices and research design. Therefore, among the academics
who gave the name of an effect size statistic, a higher proportion
of participants had read or used meta-analytic studies, had been
reviewers for scientific journals, had published an article in
journals with a JCR impact factor (Journal Citation Reports
of WoS), and thought that meta-analytic studies were the
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TABLE 2 | Known effect size statistics (%) (95% Confidence Interval).
Effect size statistics Current Study(n = 71) Spanish academics (n= 323)
(Badenes-Ribera et al., 2016a)
Difference scores between Italian and
Spanish academics
Cohen’s d 66.2 (54.6, 76.1) 70.6 −4.4 (−16.9, 6.8)
η
2 60.6 (48.9, 71.1) 44 16.6 (3.8, 28.4)
Correlation/Association
coefficient (Pearson,
Spearman, biserial, Phi,
Cramer’s V )
35.2 (25.1, 46.8) 24.8 10.4 (−0.8, 22.9)
Omega/omega2 15.5 (8.9, 25.7) 8.1 7.4 (−0.1, 17.9)
R2 14.1 (7.8, 24) 9.9 4.2 (−3.1, 14.5)
Hedge’s g 11.3 (5.8, 20.7) 10.8 0.5 (−6.2, 10.3)
Cohen’s f/Cohen’s f2 11.3 (5.8, 20.7) 2.8 8.5 (2.5, 18)
Odds Ratio 8.5 (3.9, 17.2) 5.9 2.6 (−2.9, 11.6)
Relative Risk 5.6 (2.2, 13.6) 2.5 3.1 (−1, 11.2)
Cohen’s q 4.2 (1.5, 11.7) NR –
Beta 2.8 (0.8, 9.7) 0.9 1.9 (−0.8, 8.8)
Glass’ delta NR 1.9 –
Number Needed to
Treat (NNT)
NR 0.9 –
Wilk’s Lambda NR 0.6 –
Epsilon/Epsilon2 NR 0.6 –
Cliff’s delta NR 0.3 –
Common Language
(CL)
NR 0.3 –
The majority of participants reported knowing more than one effect size statistic. %, Percentage. NR, Not Reported.
TABLE 3 | Self-reported Use of statistics (%) (95% Confidence Interval).
Used quite often Used a fair amount Used sometimes Used very little Not used
ANOVA 62.9 (55.2, 70) 20.8 (15.2, 27.7) 10.1 (6.3, 15.7) 3.1 (1.4, 7.2) 3.1 (1.4, 7.2)
Correlation 54.7 (47, 62.3) 25.2 (19.1, 32.4) 14.5 (9.8, 20.8) 1.9 (0.6, 5.4) 3.8 (1.7, 8)
Regression 47.8 (40.2, 55.5) 27 (20.7, 34.4) 17 (11.9, 23.6) 5 (2.6, 9.6) 3.1 (1.4, 7.2)
T-tests 27.7 (21.3, 35.1) 37.7 (30.6, 45.5) 22.6 (16.8, 29.8) 7.6 (4.4, 12.7) 4.4 (2.2, 8.8)
Effect size 35.9 (28.8, 43.6) 18.2 (13.6, 25.7) 13.8 (9.3, 20.1) 17 (11.9, 23.6) 15.1 (10.4, 21.5)
Confidence intervals 27.7 (21.3, 35.1) 27.7 (21.3, 35.1) 17.6 (12.5, 24.3) 17 (11.9, 23.6) 10.1 (6.3, 15.7)
Effect size and CIs 25.8 (19.6, 33.1) 21.4 (15.7, 28.4) 17 (11.9, 23.6) 18.9 (13.6, 25.7) 17 (11.9, 23.6)
Exploratory factorial analysis 26.4 (20.2, 33.8) 23.9 (17.9, 31.1) 19.5 (14.1, 26.3) 17 (11.9, 23.6) 13.2 (8.8, 19.4)
Confirmatory factorial analysis 23.3 (17.4, 30.4) 18.9 (13.6, 25.7) 21.4 (15.7, 28.4) 24.5 (18.5, 31.8) 12 (7.8, 17.9)
Structural equations 17.6 (12.5, 24.3) 17 (11.9, 23.6) 16.4 (11.4, 22.9) 22 (16.3, 29.1) 27 (20.7, 34.4)
MANOVA 24.5 (18.5, 31.8) 33.3 (26.5, 41) 21.4 (15.7, 28.4) 14.5 (9.8, 20.8) 6.3 (3.5, 11.2)
Discriminant analysis 3.1 (1.4, 7.2) 11.3 (7.3, 17.2) 22.6 (16.8, 29.8) 37.7 (30.6, 45.5) 24.5 (18.5, 31.8)
%, Percentage.
type of review with the most credibility. Furthermore, as in
the original research, Italian academics who named an effect
size statistic performed better methodological practices than
the rest of the participants. Thus, fewer of them confused
planning the statistical power a priori as a strategy to adjust
the significance level or alpha value, and a larger percentage
stated that they estimated the a priori sample size, and planned
the number of participants using statistical criteria. However,
only a third of them followed the statistical recommendations
of avoiding p-value expressions such as p < alpha or p >
alpha, and used the exact p-value instead. Moreover, they
said they knew that there was currently open debate about
statistical issues or the research design (n = 49), unlike in
the original research, where most of the participants did not
know that there was an open debate on these topics. In fact,
most of these participants (73.5% of 49 academics) mentioned
some issue associated with criticism of the NHST approach
(e.g., interpretation p-values, publication bias, false positive,
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TABLE 4 | Opinion, reading or use of meta-analytic studies (%) (95% Confidence Interval).
Current Study (N = 159) Spanish academics (N = 472)
(Badenes-Ribera et al., 2016a)
Difference scores between Italian
and Spanish academics
OPINIONS ABOUT THE REVIEW WITH MOST CREDIBILITY AND OBJECTIVITY
The quantitative review or meta-analysis 73.6 (66.2, 79.8) 57.4 16.2 (7.61, 23.9)
The narrative review carried out by experts 16.4 (11.4, 22.9) 34.3 −17.9 (−24.6, −10.24)
The qualitative review 10.1 (6.3, 15.7) 8.3 1.8 (−2.9, 7.9)
READING OR USE OF META-ANALYTIC STUDIES
I have never read or used one 27.7 (21.3, 35.1) 14.4 13.3 (6, 21.2)
I have read or used 1–2 meta-analytic studies 61.6 (53.9, 68.8) 30.1 31.5 (22.7, 39.8)
I have read or used more than 2 meta-analytic studies 10.7 (6.8, 16.5) 55.5 −44.8 (−50.7, −37.5)
%, Percentage.
p-hacking etc.). For instance, 30.6% cited alternative statistical
methods to NHST proposed in the literature (e.g., effect size;
Bayesian approach, estimation by confidence intervals), and 14%
mentioned the importance of conducting replication studies. By
contrast, among academics who did not give the name of an
effect size statistic and said they knew about the debate about
statistical issues or the research design (n = 26), only 42.3%
(95% CI 25.5, 61.1) cited an issue associated with criticism of
the NHST approach (e.g., interpretation of p-values, effect size
statistics, Bayesian approach, estimation by confidence interval,
and replication). The most prevalent issue mentioned was the
debate about quantitative vs. qualitative approaches to conduct
research (19.2%).
Finally, in both groups, the majority of the participants said
they did not know of any checklist to assess the quality of a study
design, a result also found in the original research. In addition,
when the participants were asked to mention the name of a
checklist, the percentage who actually mentioned the name of at
least one checklist was a little lower. Only 12.7% (95% CI 6.8,
22.4) of the participants who named an ES, and 8% (95% CI
3.9, 15.5) of the participants who did not, actually mentioned a
checklist. Again, there was a higher self-reported knowledge level
than actual knowledge. The checklists mentioned most were the
Strobe Statement, PRISMA, CONSORT, Newcastle-Ottawa Scale
(NOS), and Journal Articles Reporting Standards (JARS).
In addition, they did not have the practical significance
fallacy, that is, the false belief that the p-value indicates the
importance of the findings, unlike in the original research, where
the participants who did not name an effect size statistic had a
higher percentage of this misconception about the p-value.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our work was a direct replication of the study by Badenes-
Ribera et al. (2016a). We found that reporting ES statistics and
their CI is becoming generalized, as in the original research.
Hence, the majority of participants (54.1%) stated that they used
ES statistics a fair amount, and 47.2% of them said that they
used CIs for ES statistics a fair amount. Therefore, academic
psychologists show some signs of change, after half a century of
arguments against NHST and calls to adopt alternative practices.
However, changing statistical practice is not easy. For example,
contemporary researchers have not been sufficiently trained to
adopt methodological alternatives; most of them have been
trained in courses focused on calculating and reporting the
results of NHST. In addition, the methods needed to calculate
ES statistics and their CIs are not available in most statistical
software programs.
The effect size statistics most widely known by participants
were those from the family of standardized mean differences
and η2, which are parametric effect size statistics. These findings
suggest that the participants did not know, or at least did
not mention, the alternatives to parametric effect size statistics,
such as non-parametric statistics (e.g., Spearman’s correlation),
the robust standardized mean difference (trimmed means and
Winsorized variances), the number needed to treat, or the
probability of superiority (PS) (Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich,
2008; Keselman et al., 2008; Grissom and Kim, 2012).
Furthermore, standardized mean differences (e.g., Cohen’s
d, Glass’ delta, Hedges’ g,) and effect sizes from the types of
correlations (e.g., Pearson’s correlation, R2, η2, omega2) have
been criticized for not showing robustness against outliers or
for departing from normality, and instability when statistical
assumptions are violated (Algina et al., 2005; Wang and
Thompson, 2007; Grissom and Kim, 2012; Kline, 2013; Peng
and Chen, 2014). These findings provide more evidence of
the need for statistical training programs for academics in
order to improve their professional practice and teaching, given
that through their teaching activities they will influence many
students who will have a professional future in the field of
Psychology.
Regarding their opinions about reviews, the majority of the
participants considered systematic reviews and meta-analytic
studies to be more credible and objective than other types
of literature reviews. They also thought they had adequate
knowledge about meta-analyses and stated that they used meta-
analytic studies in their professional practice. Nevertheless, they
acknowledged having poor knowledge about effect sizes and
graphic displays formeta-analyses, such as forest plots and funnel
plots. Graphic portrayal of results is an important aspect of
a meta-analysis and the main tool for presenting results from
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different studies on the same research topic (Borenstein et al.,
2009; Anzures-Cabrera andHiggins, 2010). Thus, forest plots and
funnel plots are graphics used in meta-analytic studies to present
pooled effect size estimates and publication bias, respectively. In
fact, the funnel plot is used as a publication bias detectionmethod
in the health sciences (Sterne et al., 2005). In the absence of
publication bias, the plot presents a symmetrical inverted funnel;
and in the presence of bias, the plot is asymmetrical. However,
it should be taken into account that there are other sources that
can contribute to the asymmetry of a funnel plot and should not
be confused with publication bias, such as heterogeneity, chance,
or the choice of the statistics being plotted (Sterne et al., 2011;
Badenes-Ribera et al., 2017a). Moreover, the visual inspection
of funnel plots to detect publication bias is open to subjective
interpretation by researchers (Jin et al., 2015).
In addition, publication bias is common in meta-analytic
studies (Ferguson and Brannick, 2011). Therefore, publication
bias is an important threat to the validity of meta-analytic
studies because meta-analytically derived estimates could be
inaccurate, typically overestimated. Consequently, publication
bias may distort scientific knowledge about topics related to
health and other topics of scientific interest (Rothstein et al.,
2005). As Kepes et al. (2014) point out, publication bias has
been referred to as “the Achilles’ heel of systematic reviews”
(Torgerson, 2006), “the kryptonite of evidence-based practice”
(Banks and McDaniel, 2011), and the “antagonist of effective
policy making” (Banks et al., 2012). Therefore, researchers,
academics, and practitioners must have adequate knowledge
about the funnel plot, which is a basic tool of meta-analytic
studies to detect bias publication and heterogeneity of effect sizes,
allowing the reader to appraise whether the results of the meta-
analysis reflect an undistorted view of effect sizes (Bauer, 2007).
Consequently, training programs in skills to evaluate meta-
analyses are needed so that academics can appraise the quality
and relevance of available evidence stemming from them (Spring,
2007; Walker and London, 2007).
Regarding the methodological quality checklists, as in the
original research, most of the participants said they did not
have any knowledge about them. In relation to the above, it
should be clarified that there are checklists for primary studies
(e.g., CONSORT) and for meta-analytic studies (e.g., AMSTAR
or PRISMA-NMA). These checklists are useful for appraising
research evidence (Spring, 2007).
Finally, as in the original research, when analyzing the
researcher’s behavior with regard to methodological practices,
the results showed that participants with some knowledge of
effect size statistics demonstrated better statistical and research
design practices, participated more in the peer review process,
and published in high-impact journals. Nevertheless, a large
proportion continue to use p-values that revolve around the alpha
value (as in study by Giofrè et al., 2017), and are not sure why
statistical power should be planned a priori. Nevertheless, unlike
in the original research, a larger percentage of Italian academics
stated they knew there was an open debate about statistical
practices and did not commit the significance fallacy. Given what
we know about researchers’ understanding of significance testing
(e.g., misconceptions about the p-value), we did not expect Italian
academics to be completely aware of this issue. It is possible
that the answer to the question about the significance fallacy
was largely determined by the undertone that “no” was the right
answer, rather than reflecting what they really thought.
In summary, the main similarities observed between the
original group and the present group were on the level of
(un)knowledge about statistical terms and the use of statistical
techniques, given that they seem to know the same statistical
terms and techniques, and the statistical techniques they said
they do not know and do not use are approximately the
same. These findings suggest that both academic groups receive
similar statistical and methodological training in their countries.
Therefore, to improve the academic training, new statistics
programs and textbooks are needed with information about how
to calculate and report effect sizes and their confidence intervals,
and how to interpret the findings of meta-analytic studies.
On the other hand, the main difference between the two
studies was that in the original study, academics with greater
knowledge about ES statistics presented a profile closer to good
statistical practice and research design, whereas in the present
study, the difference between the methodological profile of
academics who gave the name of an ES statistic and academics
who did not was less clear. In both groups, a profile close to
good statistical practice and research design can be observed.
This difference between Spanish academics and Italian academics
might be explained by the time that passed between one study
and the other (nearly 3 years). During that time, the debate
about the use, understanding, and abuse of the p-value, good
statistical practices, and research design was re-opened. In
addition, publications on good statistical practices increased
(e.g., Cumming, 2014; Nuzzo, 2014; DeCoster et al., 2015;
Earp and Trafimow, 2015; Valentine et al., 2015), in addition
to editorial journals encouraging researchers to change their
statistical practice from reporting NHST to alternatives such as
reporting ES and their CIs (e.g., Trafimow andMarks, 2015). The
renewed debate, publications, and editorial journals might have
influenced the methodological behavior of Italian academics.
In fact, a larger percentage of Italian academics than Spanish
academics knew about this statistical practice debate.
LIMITATIONS
We acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, the low
response rate could have affected the results because, of the 1,824
academic psychologists who received an e-mail with the link to
the survey, only 159 participated (8.72%). The low response rate
might affect the representativity of the sample and, consequently,
the generalizability of the results. In addition, the participants
who answered the survey may have felt more confident about
their knowledge of statistics than the academics who did not
respond. Thus, the findings might overestimate the knowledge
level and self-reported use of ES, CIs, and meta-analysis, and the
extent of the statistical reform in Italian academic psychologists.
Furthermore, some participants do not use quantitative methods
at all, making them more reluctant to respond.
Another limitation is that we asked respondents to use Likert-
scale items to capture whether they felt adequately knowledgeable
about a specific statistic. However, this question and response
format do not allow us to know whether the respondents
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are deceiving themselves. That is, these questions are actually
measuring their belief and confidence about their knowledge, but
their actual knowledge might be quite different. Several studies
on NHST indicate that a large number of academics in various
degrees have incorrect knowledge about statistical significance
or CIs (e.g., Hoekstra et al., 2014; Badenes-Ribera et al., 2015,
2016a). This bias could be controlled in future research by
formulating the questions (e.g., about the correct interpretation
of a specific forest plot, funnel plot, effect size, or regression
analysis) using a format with three or four responses or asking an
open-ended question. These response formats make it possible
to assess knowledge about statistical terms, which would provide
more information.
Another limitation related to the items on the questionnaire
used is that, because the questionnaire targets multiple issues,
the information about each of these topics is rather limited.
That is, some items on the questionnaire are quite generic.
However, because the purpose of this work was to replicate
the study by Badenes-Ribera et al. (2016a), we maintained the
question format to facilitate the comparison of the two studies.
Examples of items with problems are: the questions about CIs
only collect information about whether the participants think
they understand what CIs are and whether they are used, but
they do not detect whether the participants correctly interpret
the CIs. The question “Have you read or used a meta-analytic
study?” would be much more informative as: “How many meta-
analyses do you think you’ve read in your career?” or something
along these lines. The question “What kind of strategy do
you use when you want to plan the sample size of a study?”
should have been an open question, which would have been
far more informative. Finally, the question “In your opinion,
what statistical questions or issues related to the study design are
currently being debated?” could have been more specific, directly
asking whether the respondents know about the debate on the
criticisms of the NHST approach, or any alternative statistical
methods to NHST. In this case, we thought social desirability
might affect the participants’ answers, and we believed it was
better to ask first about the existence of an open debate, and then
about what issues are being debated.
Indeed, it is possible that there was a social desirability
effect, which can occur when data are collected through self-
report questionnaires. For instance, as in the original study, the
percentage of participants who said they had adequate knowledge
about the effect size term was higher than the percentage of
participants who could name an ES statistic, and the percentage
of participants who said they could name an ES statistic was
higher than the percentage of participants who actually did
so. The same pattern of answers was noted when we asked
participants if they knew of a checklist for assessing the research
design of a study and then they were asked to mention the name
of one. The percentage of response was a little lower on the latter
question.
Nevertheless, all our findings agree with the study carried
out with Spanish academic psychologists (Badenes-Ribera et al.,
2016b), practitioner psychologists (Badenes-Ribera et al., 2017b),
and prior research analyzing the use of effect size statistics and
their confidence intervals in scientific journals with impact (Fritz
et al., 2012; Peng et al., 2013; Tressoldi et al., 2013; Giofrè et al.,
2017). In these studies, a majority use of the NHST procedure can
be noted, as well as an increase in the use of effect size statistics
(such as Cohen’s d and the R2/η2) and CIs for ES.
All of these findings indicate that, although the use of
effect-size estimators is becoming generalized, several inadequate
statistical practices persist, for instance, using statistical inference
techniques (e.g., ANOVA and T-test) without reporting effect
size estimations and/or confidence intervals for the effect size
estimated, and the use of relative (or inexact) p-values.
Changing statistical practice is not easy. This change requires
the deinstitutionalization of NHST, which in turn, needs cultural-
cognitive, normative, and regulative preconditions (Orlitzky,
2012). To do so, changes must be made in undergraduate
and graduate training (Giofrè et al., 2017), which focus on
calculating and reporting the NHST. These courses should
include alternatives to traditional statistical approaches. In
addition, the most widely used statistical software programs
(e.g., SPSS) do not include the calculation of CIs for ES among
their options, or the calculation of robust effect sizes, and
so they should be updated to facilitate change in statistical
practice. There are several free and open statistical software
programs (e.g., Jamovi) to assist researchers in estimating
ES and constructing confidence intervals for ES estimates
computed from sample data (this software is available from
https://www.jamovi.org). Moreover, there are several websites
that allow the computation of ES estimators and their CIs
(for more information see Fritz et al., 2012; Peng et al.,
2013).
In addition, the change requires journal editors and reviewers
to clearly and decisively ask authors to report effect size statistics
and their confidence intervals. Journal editors and reviewers are
crucial in checking the practices proposed are adopted by Peng
et al. (2013) and Giofrè et al. (2017).
In short, good statistical practice, good research design and
correct interpretation of the results in a context are essential
components of a good scientific practice for the accumulation of
a valid scientific knowledge (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). There
remains a clear need to raise awareness among professionals and
academics in Psychology about these guidelines, but especially to
promote the education and training in the use of these practices
in order to build better science. Evidence-based practices require
professionals to critically assess the findings from psychological
research. In order to do so, training in statistical concepts,
research design methodology, and results of statistical inference
tests has to be provided.
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